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Pep Guardiola Outsmarts Europe’s Ultimate Shape Shifters

By Marcus Raymond

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Going into Tuesday’s Champions League Quarterfinal second leg tie against Porto, Bayern Munich seemed like a team in crisis. After losing the first leg 3-1 in Portugal, manager Pep Guardiola had fallen out with long-time team doctor Hans-Wilhelm Müller-Wohlfahrt, causing the latter to leave the club. The disagreement centred around the handling of certain players, as well as the extensive number of injuries Bayern have endured this season (they were without Javier Martinez, Arjen Robben, David Alaba, Bastian Schweinsteiger, Franck Ribery and Medhi Benetia for both legs of the tie). This, combined with the fact that some players would continue their rehabilitation with the recently departed Müller-Wohlfahrt, led many to suggest that Guardiola was everything from tyrannical to ornery to in the process of being undermined at the club.

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However, the response from his team was emphatic; so how were 10 of the 11 Bayern players who started in Estádio do Dragão able to produce the riotous performance they had previous seemed incapable of? To answer that, you first have to look at Porto, a side that has been defined by change over the past 11 years. Ever since Jose Mourinho left the club in 2004, Porto have continually lost their best assets summer after summer, whether that be managers (Mourinho and Andre Villas-Boas among others) or players (with a total in sales since 2004 totally over $650m). This has meant that part of the club’s philosophy is to make no player irreplaceable or indispensable; keeping an able backup behind every starter should he be lost to Europe’s elite.

This has allowed the club to become Europe’s ultimate shape shifters, the players are different; yet Porto remains the same. However, despite this mantra, it was two such starters that were unable to play in the second leg due to suspensions picked up in the first leg that proved crucial to Porto’s undoing, with Brazilian fullbacks Danilo, who is moving to Real Madrid in the summer, and Alex Sandro, also seemingly on the way out, watching from the stands of a packed, raucous Allianz.

While the modern fullback is seen as a doubling as a second winger, these two appear almost post-modern, both are fantastic athlete and Danilo in particular is an excellent defender, supplementing his attacking prowess. Both are effective link men as well, with good passing range and accuracy, meaning that when in attack Porto often look to play through their multi-talented fullbacks. Defensively as well they take on responsibilities many others across Europe can’t, often being left on an island with opposing wingers as Porto look to compact their midfield three and keep their own wingers higher up the pitch for any potential counterattack. Because of this reliance and extra tactical responsibilities, they have become very hard for manager Julen Lopetegui (a former teammate of Guardiola) to replace.

He elected to stick with Porto’s usual 4-3-3 formation, with the same front six that had terrorised Bayern with their high pressing without the ball in the first leg. To replace Danilo at right back Lopetegui selected Diego Reyes, a 22 year-old Mexican centre back who can cover at fullback if needed. On the left Lopetegui shifted Bruno Martins Indi from the centre back role he played in the first leg over to cover for Alex Sandro and in his place in the middle the manager went with journeyman Spanish centre back Ivan Marcano. His intentions were clear: compact the pitch, with two big fullbacks who would, due to their natural positions, would tuck in to help their centre backs. Both Reyes and Martins Indi are more athletic than more centre backs; yet in comparison to the men they were replacing they are considerably slower and less agile, meaning that Porto had to more or less abandon their high pressing game for fear of exposing the two makeshift fullbacks.

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Back to Bayern, and Guardiola, due to the aforementioned injury crisis, was more or less forced to pick the same eleven as played in Portugal, with the only difference being Holger Badstuber replacing Dante and centre back. However, knowing that Porto would be without their two star fullbacks, Guardiola set his team out to attack the newfound weakness and they did so with ruthless efficiency. In the first leg, Bayern’s attack was too narrow, with Mario Götze and Thomas Muller playing on the wings. Both are players who naturally look to come inside to collect the ball, and with neither Bernat on the left nor Rafinha on the right being able to get the better on Danilo or Alex Sandro respectively, Bayern’s play became bogged down and congested. On Tuesday Guardiola made a couple of subtle adjustments to counteract this, with both working superbly.

Firstly, on the left hand side of Bayern’s attack, he made sure Götze stayed tight to the touchline, allowing him to double up with Bernat, this pulled Reyes away from Porto’s centre back pairing, while also forcing left winger Ricardo Queresma to track back and defend This was something he wasn’t particularly willing to do at 21, let alone 31 as he is now. On the right, he moved Muller over to attacking midfielder and shifted Philipp Lahm out to right wing. This caused him to hug the touchline with Rafinha pushing forward from right back in support. This stretched a team that had come to the Allianz looking to be compact, forcing center backs playing out of position in Martins Indi and Reyes to defend smaller, quicker players in space.

In turn, this gave Bayern’s midfield distributors in Thiago Alacantara and Alonso more time, with Porto’s midfield dropping deeper to cover the spaces left by a stretched back four. The two were able to dominate possession and control the tempo, as well as unleash their equally impressive range and variety of passes, a lack of any real pressure meaning they could pick Porto apart from near the halfway line; with intricate passing followed by sweeping switches of play to expose a two on one on the other side of the pitch.

All three of Bayern’s five first-half goals came from crosses. It was easily the second of these goals, Bayern’s third overall, that showed best exactly what changes Guardiola had made. It started with a lovely bit of passing between Lahm, Alonso and Rafinha along the right touchline. The ball then shifted inside to Thiago who didn’t have anyone within 15 meters of him. He hit a beautiful first time ball up the touchline to an onrushing Lahm, who volleyed in a cross when Martins Indi was too slow to get out to him. It went straight to Muller, who, in his new role as attacking midfielder rather than makeshift winger, was able to move freely around the attacking third and terrorized Porto all night. He flicked the ball on perfectly for Robert Lewandowski to head into the net. It was a magnificent goal, with the three last passes in particular being both immensely difficult and unerringly accurate, while the distance they covered highlighted the expansive approach Guardiola requested on the night.

It was brilliant from the Spaniard with his tweaks meaning that players who were not familiar to defending in space were isolated and picked off. This exposed the gaps created behind them. Of course everyone knew coming into the game that Pep is indeed a tactical savant, able to think. and work his way out of almost every problem he has faced as a manager. However, it was a sharp reminder to the rest of Europe that those skills haven’t lessened since his move to Germany. In fact with a healthy squad, he may once again be able to use that tactical acumen to drive this Bayern team to another Champions League victory.

Next: Van Gaal, Manchester United have decisions to make

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