15 Minutes of Mayhem From Guardiola and Bayern Munich
How is he going to do it? That’s was the question on everyone’s lips in the lead up the the first leg of the Champions League semifinal between Barcelona and Bayern Munich at The Camp Nou on Wednesday night. “He”, of course, was returning Catalan deity Pep Guardiola; it was his first game at Barca’s iconic stadium situated in the away dugout, the “it” was the unenviable task of containing the inform side in world football while slowing down its iconic talisman.
In the pregame press conference, even Guardiola himself admitted stopping Lionel Messi was more of a philosophical ideal than it was an actual possibility. Even then though you knew the man who was one of the driving forces behind Messi’s exponential ascension was plotting and scheming around the clock to come up with a plan that at least looked to try and stop one of the best players of all time ending the tie before it got back to The Allianz. Bayern were without Arjen Robben, Franck Ribery, David Alaba and Javi Martinez and though the latter was on the bench, that seemed more a hint that he might be fit for the second leg then any kind of declaration that he was ready to go on Wednesday (although with Bayern’s current medical situation…).
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While Martinez and in particular Alaba are fantastic players, they both are relatively easily replaced like for like by others in the squad. However, having sold Xherdan Shaqiri in January, Bayern lack a true backup wide man on either side bar a few promising youth team products that were never going to be picked in this kind of situation. This narrowed Guardiola attacking options both literally and figuratively, severely hampering Bayern’s counter attack in particular, while also robbing them of by far their two best players in one on one situations. This essentially prohibited the Bayern manager from lining up in his favoured, shape shifting 4-3-3 a formation which. It’s a formation that resembles a more traditional 4-5-1 in defence, while morphing into a fluid 3-4-2-1 in attack, with Alonso dropping back beside the centre backs, the fullbacks pushing on along the touchline and Ribery and Robben tucking in toward Lewandowski (himself hardly 100% on Wednesday), allowing them to greater influence play.
Guardiola, again speaking pregame, outlined the fact he felt that the best way to beat Barcelona (and really, he should probably have as good an idea as anyone) was to pack the midfield and stop them controlling the game from the middle of the park. This belief was seemingly borne out when the team sheets were released, with Barcelona selecting a very predictable 4-3-3 and Guardiola countering with what appeared to be a 4-4-2 with a diamond midfield of Alonso, Schweinsteiger, Lahm and Thiago Alacantara, himself returning to The Camp Nou for the first time as a rival. They appeared to also be complimented by Thomas Muller, picked to play just off of Lewandowski, another move which hinted that Pep would look to pack the middle of the park.
Even in the final seconds before the kick-off though, pundits and twitter users alike where providing endless hypotheses as to how exactly Bayern would set up. Would they press high? Try and play possession football and take the sting out of the game? Or would they sit back to start the game and look to grab a goal later on?
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When the referee blew his whistle at 8:45 local time though, I don’t think anyone could have accurately predicted what happened next. Contrary to all popular opinion, analysis and seemingly common sense, Bayern set up to man mark Barcelona an every position, a fact clearly visible in this Sky Sports image. This meant that Benatia was one on one with Neymar, Boateng was in the middle of the defence on Suarez and, in a particularly alarming move, Rafinha was left to mark Messi alone, while lining up at the wholly unfamiliar position of left centre back. What followed was an unhinged, manic, exhilarating 15 minutes of football the likes of which we literally may never see again. Such was the sheer out of the box nature of Pep’s setup which more resembled a college basketball defence that anything seen in football, it was clear for the first five minutes that Barcelona’s players were simply unsure of how to process what they were seeing. In fact, in some weird vindication of the scheme, Barca seemed unable to hold on to the ball in the early stages, often giving it away cheaply against Bayern’s full court press.
It was therefore both wildly counterintuitive and strangely appropriate that in the 12th minute Barca carved out their best chance of the first half in the least Barca way imaginable. With Bayern’s man-marking cutting off any short passes for goalkeeper Marc-Andre Ter Stegen, the German was forced to go long; picking out Lionel Messi just inside Barca’s half. With the ball still approaching the best player of his generation, Suarez spun in behind Boateng, timing his run perfectly so that when Messi remarkably won the flick on against Rafinha he was behind the centre back, yet was kept onside by Benatia on the other side of the pitch. He was denied magnificently by Manual Neuer and, after Barcelona almost took the lead again in the 14th minute, with only a desperate block from Rafinha preventing them from doing so, Guardiola returned to a more old-fashioned defensive structure, falling back into the midfield diamond it seemed inevitable he’d have to start with.
Many have criticised Pep for the way his team played in the opening 15 minutes, suggesting, with justification, that attempting to mark Barcelona’s front three man on man betrays a borderline suicidal nature as opposed to a tactically astute one. However, it seemed clear to me that it was merely a plan for the opening exchanges rather than anything more long lasting, such was the efficiency and planning that appeared to go into their formational shift after the 15 minute mark.
In that time, they were only really undone by the system itself once and that came because Messi won a header on the halfway line; the footballing equivalent on Halley’s Comet. The other good chance Barca created came as a result of Bayern giving away possession in a dangerous area, an event that could have occurred regardless of the system Bayern were employing at the time.
Of course, there are several glaring flaws in this hyper aggressive system; firstly, in is only a ploy that can be used in spurts, given the immense intensity and energy it take to maintain. In fact it is possible that the reason some of Bayern’s older players were seemingly off the pace at the end of the game was because of those early, energy-sapping excursions. Secondly, as seen on the Suarez chance, Bayern were left unable to hold a defensive line, as each player in the line was working individually to look after the player they were marking.
Finally, the main issue people appeared to have with the tactic is that if a player on the ball beats his man, he should then have a lot of space in front of him. This is where Guardiola’s meticulous planning came into effect though, as any time that did happen, his charges would immediately drop into a deeper, more compact shape, not allowing Barcelona to take advantage. In the time since the match, Guardiola has been widely criticised for the way he set out his team in the opening minutes, but in reality, after rewatching that period of the game, it was really more or less even bar the Suarez chance, with the major criticism of Bayern being that they were unable to take advantage when they won the ball back high up the pitch.
It appears therefore that the main reason for the backlash is twofold. Part of it is, like Barcelona, fans and experts alike were gobsmacked with the system Bayern started with and, as with many so called “gimmicky” tactical changes, therefore reacted negatively as almost a gut reaction. This is perhaps partially because of the actual spectacle of watching Bayern back three marking that front three one on one, a sight that really did take some getting used to. However, underscoring (and from a neutral’s perspective overriding) any tactic opinion is the simple fact that that 15 minutes was some of the most exciting, open, intense football anyone could hope to see; characterised by quick, sharp passing and almost perpetual changes of possession. It short, it was a job to watch, both from an aesthetic and tactical perspective, regardless of its results.